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Abstract
This paper deals with the trade and welfare effects of a potential bilateral trade
agreement between the US and Japan. A possible agreement is currently being
discussed between Washington and Tokyo, although, there is also the alternative for
the US government joining Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Based on the theoretical
model of Caliendo and Parro (2015) I analyse the welfare gains of such a bilateral free
trade agreement (FTA) in the style of Aichele et al. (2014). In particular, I simulate
three scenarios with different levels of integration: The reduction of tariffs only, the
scenario of a shallow FTA, and a deep FTA. In addition, the paper compares the
trade and welfare changes of a deep FTA to the welfare effects of TPP. The findings
are that Japan has the highest welfare gains with a FTA (0.085%), whilst the United
States benefits the most from TPP with a welfare gain of 0.05%.
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1. Introduction
In the last decade, the value of US exports have grown strongly from 1.3 trillion US$ in 2005
to over 2.2 trillion US$ in 2015.1 Hereby, trade agreements play a significant role as they open
up foreign markets for US companies and products. In 2015, 47% of the US exports went to
countries with an established US trade agreement.2 Remarkably, Japan as the third largest global
economy is the most important trading partner of the United States without a trade agreement
in place. To adress this the multilateral Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was sought to structure
the trade relationship between both countries. But TPP also involves other countries such as
Australia, Canada, Chile, and Mexico. It is expected to bring additional economic growth to
the TPP member countries including the United States. However, after the US Election in 2016
one of the first steps of the new administration was to put the negotiations on TPP on a hold.
The newest trade strategy for the Trump administration is now to focus on bilateral free trade
agreements (FTA) in order to have a higher bargaining power. According to the US Commerce
Secretary Wilbur Ross a bilateral agreement between two of the world’s largest economies has “a
very high priority” and is considered to be a forth runner for further bilateral trade agreements.3
However, there are also tendencies from the White House to restart the negotiations on TPP,
particularly, to strengthen the exports of the US agriculture sector. The aim of this paper is
to evaluate the trade and welfare gains of a FTA between Japan and the United States and to
compare these results to the potential trade effects of TPP.
Surprisingly, not much research has been done on the welfare effects of this particular trade
agreement. Research has been conducted on a potential FTA between the EU and Japan (Benz
and Yalcin (2013) and Felbermayr et al. (2017b)). But for a bilateral FTA between the United
States and Japan there are only reports, investigating the FTA from a geopolitical and advisory
perspective but not from the economic side (Scissors and Blumenthal (2017) and Cooper (2014)).
With this paper I fill this gap, by analyzing the potential welfare gains of the FTA using the
theoretical model of Caliendo and Parro (2015)4, which builds on assumptions adopted from the
1In current US$. Data source: World Bank (2018)
2International Trade Administration (2018)
3US Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross in The Diplomat (2017)
4For the analysis of this paper I rely on the codes and data files thankfully provided by Caliendo and
Parro (2015).
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new quantitative trade theory5. Applying the Caliendo and Parro (2015) model provides several
advantages: First, following the theoretical model of Eaton and Kortum (2002), Caliendo and
Parro (2015) allow producers to purchase goods from the lowest cost supplier in the economy.
This assumption paves the way to use the gravity equation, which explains the trade flows
between countries and is comfortable to apply. Secondly, the model solves for a counterfactual
equilibrium in relative changes through which structural parameters that are difficult to identify
cancel out and do not have to be estimated empirically. Caliendo and Parro (2015) borrow
this approach from Dekle et al. (2008). Thirdly, their model is a multi-sector multi-country
model with intermediate goods. This is particularly useful for the investigation of the FTA
between Japan and the United States, as the impact of trade agreements does not only depend
on the degree of policy changes but also on the interrelation between industries. Hereby, the
input-output analysis (Leontief (1951)) plays an important role. The international economy can
be seen as an interlinked production network where the output of one sector can become the
input for another. An impulse of trade policy can be passed on and impact other sectors as well.
A difference between this paper and Caliendo and Parro (2015) is that this paper tries to predict
the effect of the potential FTA ex-ante while Caliendo and Parro (2015) estimate the effect of
NAFTA ex-post.
To solve for the welfare gains I borrow the empirical strategy from Aichele et al. (2014).
The approach is useful as it takes not only tariffs but also the non-tariff measures (NTM) into
account. In general, trade agreements can take on different intensity levels to remove trade
impediments. These can vary from reducing tariffs to deeper integration, where NTMs are
minimized. The reduction of NTMs can include the standardization of regulatory legislation and
industry standards as well as the opening of markets to foreign investments. The details of the
potential FTA between the US and Japan are not known, as the negotiations have not officially
started yet, even though it is commonly assumed that the FTA will lead to deeper integration.
To estimate the impact of NTMs, I therefore apply the top-down method and use past trade
agreements as a benchmark to quantify the possible welfare impact of the FTA.6
This paper contributes in two ways to the literature. It is not only one of the first on the
welfare effects of the potential FTA between Japan and the US, but it also simulates different
scenarios by conducting a counterfactual analysis. In the first scenario, all of the tariffs are cut,
5See Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2014) for more details.
6In order to estimate the impact of the NTMs I use the necessary dummy variables from Aichele et al.
(2014).
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while the second scenario cuts the tariffs to zero and additionally reduces the NTMs slightly
(shallow FTA). The third scenario decreases all bilateral tariffs are cut to zero and reduces the
NTMs strongly (deep FTA). In addition, I compare the trade and welfare changes of the deep
FTA to the case if the Trans-Pacific Partnership (including the United States) is established.
To exercise the counterfactual simulation, I use the most recent World Input-Output Database
(WIOD) (Release 2016) as well as the UNCTAD’s TRAINS database for the tariffs as the main
data sources. The WIOD contains only data of six TPP countries, namely Japan, United States,
Canada, Mexico, Chile and Australia.7 However, those countries are responsible for 96% of the
TPP members’ GDP, through which valid interpretations are possible.
The key findings are that Japan has the largest welfare gains in the case of a deep FTA
(0.085%), when comparing the three counterfactual trade scenarios. This is not surprising as the
more trade costs are reduced the higher the welfare gains will be. More unexpected is that the
United States gets its highest welfare gains in the first scenario where all tariffs are cut (0.003%).
In the shallow and deep scenario, the welfare effects are for the United States even negative, with
-0.001% and -0.007% respectively. In addition, I find that the United States should prefer TPP by
comparing the FTA scenarios with TPP, as it leads to the largest welfare gains (0.05%). Japan
will still favor a deep FTA as its welfare gains with TPP will only be 0.05%. It is important to
note that this paper looks at the welfare changes not from a dynamic but from a static level.
Starting point is the status quo from which I siumlate the trade and welfare effects triggered by
a change in trade policy. Obviously, the impact of the trade policies cannot be seen instantly, it
is much more an economic process and the changes can take up to a decade to adopt, as Baier
and Bergstrand (2007) show.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 elaborates the stylized facts, while section
3 presents the gravity model of Caliendo and Parro (2015). Section 4 displays the strategy to
determine the change in trade costs as well as the parameter identification. Section 5 presents
the research findings. Finally, section 6 concludes.
7The other TPP countries not included in the input-output table are Brunei, New Zealand, Peru,
Singapore, Vietnam and Malaysia.
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2. Stylized Facts
The import values from Japan to the United States are constantly larger than the exports to
Japan from the United States, as Figure 2.1. displays. For the year 2014, the United States
has a trade deficit to Japan of approximately 58 billion US$. As the US government is eager to
reduce its overall trade deficit a potential FTA could help to cut the trade deficit with Japan.
The graph shows that the trade flows between the two countries were strongly hit during the
financial crisis in 2008. Imports to the United States from Japan were much more affected than
exports from United States to Japan. One of the reason for this was the decrease of the domestic
demand in the United States. As the global economic situation stabilized, trade between the
United States and Japan reached the pre-crisis level.
Figure 2.1.: US Imports & Exports in current values (Data: WIOD 2016)
Figure 2.2. indicates, the importance of the bilateral trade relationship for Japan. It presents
the import and export shares for both countries of the last two decades.8 Hereby, both shares
are significant larger for Japan. However, the import and export shares decreased for Japan by
almost 50%, e.g. the import share for Japan declined from 2000 to 2014 from 28% to 14%. Note,
8The export shares are defined as US exports to Japan relative to all US exports, same holds for import
shares.
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that the largest reduction for both shares was between 2000 and 2004. Regarding the United
States, the import and export shares decreased less than those of Japan and reached an import
share level of 5% and an export share level of 3% in 2014. A bilateral FTA between the United
States and Japan could have the potential to increase the import and export shares for both
countries.
Figure 2.2.: Import & Export Shares (Data: WIOD 2016)
In Figure 2.3. I display the bilateral exports consisting of the aggregated sectors manufacturing,
services, and agriculture. Particularly the manufacturing sector stands out. In 2014, Japan
exported around 120 billion US$ of manufacturing goods to the United States. Hereby, the car
industry is the largest export industry, followed by the computer & electronics and, the chemical
industry. The aggregated manufacturing sector is the largest export sector to Japan of the US
with roughly 45 billion US$. Amongst the US manufacturing sector, the manufacturers of food
products, transport equipment, and chemicals are the largest exporters to Japan. The other
aggregated sectors play a minor role: For Japan, expenditure in services account for 3 billion
US$ and 300 million US$ for the agriculture sectors, whereas the US is exporting around 9.1
billion US$ in services and 7.6 billion US$ in agriculture products to Japan.
The average import tariff of the United States for Japanese products is with 4% already low
and was fairly constant over the last 15 years, whereas the import tariffs on the Japanese side
are higher on average. However, the tariff decreased from around 10% in 2001 to around 8%
in 2014. Therefore, it can be said that Japan runs a more protective bilateral trade policy
in terms of tariffs than its US counterpart. Looking at the tariffs in more detail, Figure 2.4.
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Figure 2.3.: Bilateral Sector Exports in 2014, current values (Data: WIOD 2016)
displays that especially Japan is shielding its agriculture sectors from US imports. The largest
import tariffs being (on average) in the Corps & Animals, Food, Beverages & Tabaco industry.
However, as Felbermayr et al. (2017b) point out there is a large tariff heterogeneity in Japans’
agriculture sectors. On the one hand Japan particularly protects its rice industry (consisting
out of many small farms) with tariffs, quotas and subsides. On the other hand, Japan is also
depending on other imports in the food sector. This heterogeneity is also reflected in the trade
policy: According to Felbermayr et al. (2017b), 25% of the tariffs in agriculture is duty free
whereas other agriculture products are charged with tariffs up to 300%. On the US side tariffs
are smoother across sectors. The largest tariffs are charged on average on electronics (6%) as
well as on textile (4.4%) and food products (3.6%).
Figure 2.4.: Sectoral Import Tariffs in 2014 (Data: UNCTAD TRAINS 2014)
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However, trade costs do not only depend on tariffs but also involve non-tariff measures. Figure
2.5. shows the number of non-tariff measures active between the United States and Japan in
2018. As the quality of the NTMs are in general harder to measure, the quantity of the NTMs I
present in Figure 2.5 can give an indication about the costs of the trade barriers. Clearly, the
United States has more non-tariff measures in place than Japan. Especially US regulations in
the area of sanitary and phytosanitary outweighs Japan’s regulation by far: 644 NTMs of the
United States compared to 50 NTMs of Japan. Also, in the area of export-related measures and
technical barriers to trade the number of barriers is much larger from the American side.
Figure 2.5.: Total Non-Traiff Measures in 2018 (Data: UNCTAD NTB 2018)
To conclude, Japan and the United States have a significant economic relationship, however
over the last decade the trade shares have slightly decreased between both countries. This is
due to the stronger Japanese trade relationship with China and other Asian countries, as well as
the growing trade of the US with Mexico and China.9 The trade deficits of the United States
with Japan is mainly caused by trade deficits of the manufacturing sectors. On average, the US
import tariffs on Japanese goods and services are 4% points lower than vice versa. Furthermore,
Japan is protective of its agriculture sector, particularly the corps and animal sector, which
includes the rice industries. Also, the Japanese car industry is less open to foreign car makers.
As Cooper (2014) points out, only 6.7% of all cars in Japan are from foreign car companies. I
discuss the impact of a potential trade agreement in form of either a bilateral or multilateral
agreement in section 5.
9The United States has 20 FTAs with various countries in place, covering 25% of the total US exports,
whilst Japan has 16 active trade agreements that is 7% of its total exports. Note, that the calculation
is based on the WIOD 2016.
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3. The Model
The model of Caliendo and Parro (2015) builds on the well-known Eaton and Kortum (2002)
mulit-country and multi-sector Ricardian model. It also considers the input-output linkages
between tradable and non-tradable sectors. The setup of the model includes intermediate goods,
composite intermediate goods and heterogeneity in sectoral productivity. It involves the following
assumptions: There are n = 1, .., N countries which are referred to as n and i; and include
j = 1, .., J sectors indicated by j and k. The only factor of the country that counts into production
is labor Ln. Labor is mobile across sectors, but it is not mobile across countries. It is assumed
that all markets are perfectly competitive, so that price equals marginal cost.
3.1. Households
In each country n there are Ln representative households with Cobb-Douglas preferences. The
households buy final goods in amount of Cjn for the price of Pn, hence the consumer maximization
problem becomes:
max
Cjn
U(Cn) =
J∏
j=1
(
Cjn
)αjn
s.t.
J∑
j=1
P jnC
j
n = In (3.1)
Here, αjn is the share of demand for the final good in sector j of country n. It is an exogenous
parameter and it holds ∑Jj=1 αjn = 1 as well as αjn ≥ 0. In is the income of the household of
country n and includes labor income, tariff revenue and trade surplus. The solution of the price
index of the final good is given by Pn =
∏J
j=1
(
P jn/α
j
n
)αjn and the equilibrium condition is defined
as P jnCjn = αjnIn. The household uses a share of its income represented by αjn to purchase final
goods in the amount of Cjn.
3.2. Composite Intermediate Goods
Composite intermediate goods (materials) are produced by intermediate goods from the same
sector. Composite intermediate goods (qjn) are used for the production of sector-specific final
goods Cjn and intermediate goods qjn(xjn). They can be tradable, then the input can come from
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a variety of countries, or they can be non-tradable. In the case of tradable goods Ricardian
motives of trade are introduced.10 It is assumed that the access to technology varies by sector
and country, which leads to different efficiency levels in intermediate good production. Therefore,
the level of total factor productivity, also often interpreted as “costs” for each intermediate
good, can vary. The inverse total factor productivities are modeled as random and independent
variables with a common density of Φj . The common density Φj is exponential and has
the parameter of λjn : xjn∼ exp(λjn). The scale parameter λjn can be seen as the state of
technologies in sector j of country n, which determines the absolute advantage in trade. Each
intermediate good has its own cost draw xjn > 0 and is independent from the other intermediate
good. Note, that the vector of technology draws of a particular sector j with N countries
can be written as xj = (xj1, . . . , x
j
N ), then the joint density of xj is defined in the following
way Φj(xj) =
(∏N
i=1 λ
j
n
)
exp
{
−∑Ni=1 λjnxjn}. Thus, the production function of the composite
intermediate good is given by qjn =
[∫
qjn(xj)(1−1)/η
jΦj(xj)dxj
]ηj/(ηj−1)
where ηj is the constant
elasticity of substitution and varies across sectors.
Producers of the composite intermediate good purchase the sector specific intermediate good
from that country which offers the lowest price for the intermediate good. Therefore, the
minimization problem of the composite intermediate good aggregate is:
P jnq
j
n = min
qjn(xjn)
∫
pjn(xj)qjn(xj)Φj(xj)dxj
s.t.
[ ∫
qjn(xj)(1−1/η
j)Φj(xj)dxj
]ηj(ηj−1)
≥ qjn
(3.2)
Here P jnqjn is the total expenditure on composite tradable goods in sector j of country n. The
solution of the minimization problem leads to the intermediate good demand function of qjn(xj) =(
pjn(xj)
P jn
)−ηj
qjn with P jn as the price of the material P jn =
[∫
pjn(xj)(1−η
j)Φj(xj)dxj
]1/(1−ηj)
and
pjn(xj) as the lowest price for the sector specific intermediate good xj across all countries. Hence, a
change in tariffs affects the aggregated price index of intermediate goods, which in turn influences
the material price as well. This is a key mechanism in the model.
10The case of composite intermediate goods of non-tradeable sectors is displayed in the appendix A.1.
The calculation of the tradebale and the non-tradeable are based on Caliendo and Parro (2012).
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3.3. Intermediate Goods
Labor and composite intermediate goods from all sectors, tradable and non-tradable, are used as
inputs to produce the intermediate good xjn. Hereby, the production function is defined as:
qjn(xjn) = [xjn]−θ
j [ljn(xjn)]β
j
n
[
J∏
k=1
qkmn(xjn)γ
k,j
n
]1−βjn
(3.3)
where ljn(xjn) is the labor demand. The efficiency of producing the intermediate good in sector
j in country n is given by [xjn]−θ
j . The parameter θj captures the dispersion of productivity
and intensifies the productivity draws.11 The amount of materials from sector k used in the
production of the intermediate good xjn is given by qkmn(xjn). The share of composite intermediate
goods from sector k used to create the intermediate good xjn in sector j is given by γk,jn ≥ 0.
It holds ∑Jk=1 γk,jn = 1 − βjn, where βjn is the share of value added in sector j of country n.12
Producers of the tradable intermediate goods xjn maximize profits in the following way:
pjn(xjn)qjn(xjn) = min
ljn(xjn),{qkmn(xjn)}Jk=1
J∑
k=1
P kn q
k
mn(xjn) + ljn(xjn)wn
s.t.[xjn]−θ
j [ljn(xjn)]β
j
n
[
J∏
k=1
qkmn(xjn)γ
k,j
n
]1−βjn
≥ qjn(xjn) (3.4)
The solution for labor demand is given by ljn(xjn) = βjn
pjn(xjn)qjn(xjn)
wn
and the demand for composite
intermediate goods by qkmn(xjn) = γk,jn (1 − βjn)p
j
n(xjn)qjn(xjn)
Pkn
. The price of an intermediate good
is then given by pjn(xjn) = B
j
[xjn]−θj
cjn where Bj is a constant. The cost of the input bundle, cjn,
is described by the equation cjn = wβ
j
n
n
(∏J
k=1(P kn )γ
k,j
n
)1−βjn . The equation is crucial, because
through this equation the different sectors are connected. The equation shows that the cost of
the intermediate goods depends on the one hand on wages of sector j in country n and on the
other hand on the prices of all composite intermediate goods from tradable and non-tradable
11There are different notations for the dispersion parameter of productivity in Eaton and Kortum (2002)
and Alvarez and Lucas (2007), (1/θ)EK = θAL. For Eaton and Kortum (2002) θ is inversely related to
the variation of the distribution. Aichele et al. (2014) follow Eaton and Kortum (2002), while Caliendo
and Parro (2015) use the notation of Alvarez and Lucas (2007) to amplify the cost draws. Further
Caliendo and Parro (2015) allow the parameter θj to be sector-specific but common across countries.
In this paper the notation of Caliendo and Parro (2015) is followed.
12The closer βjn gets to 1 the less interactions between sector j of country n and other sectors take place.
Note that in the extreme case of βjn = 1 there will be no interrelations between sectors. Also in the
case of γj,jn = 1, all materials of sector j are used for production in the same sector. The good is
entirely produced by input of the same sector, and there is no interrelation between other sectors.
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sectors. In particular, the last part of the cost equation is essential ∏Jk=1(P kn )γk,jn . It represents
the inputs from all sectors and is responsible for the interrelation of the sectors in the economy.
Here P kn is the price of material in sector k. A price change in this particular sector, e.g. through
a change in tariff, impacts all other sectors indirectly through the input cost bundles.
3.4. Introduction of Trade Costs
Caliendo and Parro (2015) distinguish between two types of costs. The first type of costs is
defined as ad valorem flat-rate tariff τ jni, which arises as intermediate goods are imported into
country n from country i. The second type of trade costs djni, is called “iceberg cost” and is
the physical loss goods experience when traded between countries.13 “Iceberg costs” can take
on the form of a function including different variables such as bilateral distance or common
border. In this paper I borrow the approach of Aichele et al. (2014) to estimate the effects of
non-tariff measures. Aichele et al. (2014) use the top-down approach in order to estimate a
realistic reduction of trade costs. This approach investigates past trade agreements and their
impact on trade cost reductions. The results are then used as benchmarks to predict the impact
of future trade agreements. In this context, Aichele et al. (2014) use two types of dummy
variables PTAdeep and PTAshallow. Combining the two types of international trade costs leads
to kjni = τ˜
j
nid
j
ni with τ˜
j
ni = (1 + τ
j
ni) and d
j
ni = D
ρj
nie
(δj
shallow
PTAshallow,ni+δjdeepPTAdeep,ni+ζ
jRni).
Taking international trade costs into account, the price of the intermediate good depends not only
on the cost of the input bundle and the efficiency of producing the intermediate good but also on
the trade cost kjni. The producers purchase goods from the lowest-cost supplier of the economy.
Hence, the price of intermediate goods of sector j in country n becomes pjn(xj) = mini
[
Bjcji
[xji ]−θ
j k
j
ni
]
.
Using the approach of Alvarez and Lucas (2007) the gravity equation can be identified, which
displays the trade flow and the expenditure share of country n on goods from country i.
pijni =
λji [c
j
ik
j
ni]−1/θ
j∑N
h=1 λ
j
h[c
j
hk
j
nh]−1/θ
j
(3.5)
13Caliendo and Parro (2015) define it in technical terms in the following way: To get one unit from
country i to country n, requires to produce djni ≥ 1 of the unit in country i; with djnn = 1. In addition,
the triangle inequality must hold namely djnkd
j
ki ≥ djni for all n, k, i, otherwise, it would be possible
that goods are not necessarily bought from the cheapest supplier.
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3.5. Counterfactual Equilibrium
In the context of sectoral input-output linkages, the equilibrium wages and prices are such
that they maximize the consumer’s utility and the profit of the firms for each sector in each
country. In addition, good- and labor market clearing conditions must hold.14 Empirically, it
is challenging to estimate the total productivity λji and the iceberg costs d
j
ni for each sector
and country. To avoid estimating those exogenous parameters and still being able to solve the
equilibrium, Caliendo and Parro (2015) borrowed the method of relative changes from Dekle
et al. (2008). Let x be the initial level of a variable and x′ the variable under the counterfactual
level. The relative change is then defined as xˆ ≡ x′/x. The equilibrium is found for the change
in relative wages and price, by moving the tariff structure from τ to τ ′.
Definition: Let (w,P, pi, c,X) be an equilibrium under tariff structure τ and let (w′, P ′, pi′, c′, X ′)
be an equilibrium under tariff structure τˆ . Then, define (wˆ, Pˆ , pˆi, cˆ, Xˆ) as an equilibrium under τ ′
relative to τ . The general equilibrium equations are solved for an equilibrium in relative changes:
Cost change of the input bundle:
cˆjn = wˆβ
j
n
n
(
J∏
k=1
(Pˆ kn )γ
k,j
n
)1−βjn
(3.6)
Change in the price index of tradable materials:
Pˆ jn =
[∑
i
[kˆjnicˆ
j
i ](−1/θ
j)pijni
]−θj
(3.7)
Change of bilateral trade shares:
pˆijni =
(
cˆji kˆ
j
ni
Pˆ jn
)−1/θj
(3.8)
Trade expenditure in each sector j and country n:
Xjn
′ =
J∑
k=1
γj,kn (1− βjn)
(∑
i=1
pik
′
in
(1 + τk′in)
Xki
′
)
+ αj′n I ′n (3.9)
Trade balance:
J∑
j=1
F jn
′Xjn
′ + Sn =
J∑
j=1
N∑
i=1
pij
′
in
(1 + τ j′in)
Xji
′ (3.10)
14For more detail on the equilibrium conditions, see appendix A.2.
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Let the income under the new trade policy be I ′n =
[
wˆnwnLn +
∑J
j=1X
j′
n
[
1− F j′n
]
− Sn
]
, where
wˆn = w
′
n
wn
and F j′n =
∑N
i=1
pij
′
ni
(1+τ j′ni)
. Note that for the general equilibrium in relative changes, the
trade cost equation kˆjni becomes:
kˆjni =
(1 + τ j
′
ni)
(1 + τ jni)
e
δj
shallow
(PTA′(shallow,ni)−PTA(shallow,ni))+δ
j
deep
(PTA′(deep,ni)−PTA(deep,ni)) (3.11)
where the bilateral distance Dni and Rni as the vector which includes other possible trade costs
cancel out.
3.6. Solving the Model
Given those counterfactual equilibrium conditions, the system of equations can be solved through
an algorithm, which reduces the system of equations to one equation per country with the
wage as the only unknown parameter.15 The first step is to calculate the trade cost change kˆjn,
given the trade policies of τ and τ ′. To solve the algorithm, it is assumed that pijin, γj,kn , βjn,
αjn as well as the parameter of productivity θj are given for each sector. The next step is to
guess a vector of wage changes wˆ = (wˆ1, . . . , wˆn). Together with kˆjn, pi
j
in, γj,kn , βjn, δj the wage
vector wˆ is used to solve for equilibrium input costs cˆjn(wˆ) and prices Pˆ jn(wˆ) in each sector and
country. After that, the bilateral trade shares under the new trade policy pij
′
ni(wˆ) are calculated;
using cˆji (wˆ), Pˆ jn(wˆ) and kˆ
j
in and θj via pˆi
j
ni. Given pi
j′
ni(wˆ) and τ ′, the value of weighted tariffs
F jn
′ can be identified. After that solve for the total expenditure of each sector j of country n
under the new trade policy, which is Xj′n (wˆ). This is done by inserting αjn, βjn, γj,kn , τ ′ , F jn ′
and pij
′
in(wˆ) into equation 3.10 and converting it into Xj
′
n (wˆ), which is consistent with the wage
vector. This is then inserted together with pij
′
in(wˆ), Sn, τ ′ into equation 3.10, which leads to the
trade balance conditions of ∑Jj=1∑Ni=1 pij′ni(wˆ)(1+τ j′ni)Xj′n (wˆ) +Sn = ∑Jj=1∑Ni=1 pi
j′
in(wˆ)
(1+τ j′in)
Xj
′
i (wˆ). Through
this mechanism the system of equations is reduced to one equation per country, containing the
countries’ wages as the only unknown parameter. The last step is to identify the correct vector
of wage changes wˆ = (wˆ1, . . . , wˆn). The correct vector is found if the the equilibrium equation is
in balance. If the equations do not hold, the vector of wage changes have to be guessed again,
and the process is repeated. The procedure continues, until the correct vector in wage changes wˆ
is found.
15The process to solve the model is based on Caliendo and Parro (2015), for a detailed step-by-step
description see section A.3 in the appendix.
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3.7. Decomposing Welfare Effects
Having the system solved the counterfactual change in real wages Wˆn = wˆn/
∏J
j Pˆ
j
n
αjn can be
identified. However, the change in real wages is not equal to the welfare change, due to the fact
that the income of households depends also on lump sum tariff revenue. Therefore the change in
welfare can be determined by taking the total derivative of the real income Wn = In/Pn, holding
iceberg costs and exogenous trade deffcits constant, leads to the following equation:
d lnWn =
1
In
J∑
j=1
N∑
i=1
(Ejnid lncjn −M jnid lncji )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Terms of Trade
+ 1
In
J∑
j=1
N∑
i=1
τ jniMni(d lnM
j
ni − d lncji )︸ ︷︷ ︸
V olume of Trade
Hence two multilateral and multisectoral mechanisms affect the change of welfare in the model:
Terms of trade and volume of trade. Terms of trade are also known as purchasing power of a
country. It depends of the differences between exports (E) and imports (M) who are affected by
the change in export and import prices. Volume of trade depends on the tarrifs and amount of
imports and also on the change in imports weightetd by import prices.
4. Data
In this section I bring the data to the model and identify the parameters which are necessary to
solve the model empirically, once the trade policy changes are implemented.16 Due to the use of
the general equilibrium in relative changes, I do not have to estimate the parameters λji , Dni
and Rni empirically.
4.1. Strategy to determine changes in trade costs
The change in trade cost kˆjni depends on the tariffs τ and the counterfactual tariffs τ ′, as well as
the dummy variables PTAshallow, PTA′shallow, PTAdeep, PTA′deep and their parameters δj , as
seen in equation 3.11.
16Hence, the tariff changes from τ to τ ′ and/or the non-tariff barriers changes from PTA to PTA′.
14
I collect the tariff data from the UNCTAD Trade Analysis Information System (TRAINS) for
the year 2014 at the HS-based tariff line level (HS 2-digit) and transform them to the International
Standard Industrial Classification revision 4 (ISIC Rev. 4). For the computation of the analysis I
set the counterfactual tariffs τ ′ in every scenario to zero.17 Furthermore, to simulate the reduction
of the NTMs, I use the dummy variables of the top-down method, borrowed from Aichele et al.
(2014). For the classification of PTAshallow and PTAdeep Aichele et al. (2014) rely on the Design
of Trade Agreements (DESTA) database of Du¨r et al. (2014). This database covers over 790
PTAs, which include different types of FTAs and customs unions for the time span between 1947
and 2010. The database ranks the PTAs according to their strength of NTM reductions. The
index of the ranking ranges from 0 to 7.18 Aichele et al. (2014) classify trade agreements that
have an index between 0 and 4 as PTAshallow. With values above 4 the trade agreements are
considered as deep preferential trade agreements. The meaning of a PTAshallow dummy variable
is that it captures the impact if the FTA reduces NTMs as in average past trade agreements. The
PTAdeep captures the effect if the FTA goes beyond the average NTM reduction.19 In addition,
I adopt from Aichele et al. (2014) the parameters δjshallow and δ
j
deep. Those parameters are based
on the WIOD (Release 2013) for the year 2011, which I transform to fit according to the sectors
of the WIOD (Release 2016) of the year 2014. After I have determined the parameters δjshallow
and δjdeep I can estimate the trade cost kˆ
j
ni.
4.2. Parameter Identification
I use the WIOD released in 2016 as the main data source. To conduct the counterfactual analysis
I take the World Input-Output Table of the year 2014 as it is the most recent year available in
the WIOD. It covers 43 countries as well as an aggregate for the rest of the world (ROW) and
includes 56 sectors which are classified according to the ISIC Rev. 4. This dataset is usefull as it
covers around 90% of the global GDP. To avoid calculation difficulties I apply the approach of
Felbermayr et al. (2017a) and summarize the sectors with zero outputs. This is particularly the
17A detailed description and explanation of the three trade policies is found in section 5.
18Du¨r et al. (2014) present seven key provisions after which the depth of PTAs is ranked: The provision
captures the basic preferential trade agreement, services trade, investments, standards, public procure-
ment, competition and intellectual property rights. If the trade agreement capture only one provision,
it is ranked with 1, and so on.
19According to Aichele et al. (2014) most trade agreements are shallow PTAs, as for example the ASEAN
and MERCOSUR treaties, whereas only 10% of the PTAs are considered deep PTAs, e.g. the European
Union.
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case for some service sectors.20 In addition, I use the approach of Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare
(2014) to eliminate negative inventories. This is necessary because otherwise the final demand
turns out to be negative when summing up over investments, changes in inventories, and the
final consumption expenditure by households and government.21
I obtain several parameters directly from the World Input-Output Table. I calculate the share
of value added βjn by dividing the value added V Ajn over the gross output for each sector j of
country n and identify the input-output coefficient by adding all intermediate inputs of sector
i from all countries into sector j and then dividing it by the total intermediate costs of sector
j. Further, I obtain the trade flows for each sector j and country n from the WIOD, whereas
the elasticities of demand θj for the agriculture, mining and manufacture sectors I take from
Felbermayr et al. (2017a).22 Regarding the service sectors and non-tradable goods sectors Egger
et al. (2012) estimate the elasticity of demand to be 5.959. In this paper I apply the elasticity of
demand of Egger et al. (2012) for the service sectors.23 Once the parameters above are identified
I can calculate the share of the final demand good in sector j 24 and the bilateral trade share25.
5. Simulation Results
In the following, I analyze the impact of different trade policy scenarios.26 As shown before, the
tariffs between the US and Japan are already small on average. In the first scenario (only) all
bilateral tariffs are reduced to zero. It is considered as the weakest possible FTA.27 The second
20An overview of the compiled sectors is displayed in the appendix A.4.
21The apporach is also used in other papers as for example in Krebs and Pflu¨ger (2015).
22These particular elasticities of demand θj , which measures the dispersion of productivity for each sector,
are used also in other papers, e.g. Felbermayr et al. (2017c).
23Other research work also relies on the elasticity of demand of Egger et al. (2012) as in Aichele and
Heiland (2014).
24The share of the final demand good in sector j is given by αjn = (Y jn − Sjn −
∑J
k γ
j,k
n (1− βjn)Y kn )/In.
25Bilateral trade share can be obtained by pijni = Z
j
ni/(Y jn − Sjn). This is done first by calculating domestic
sales Zjnn in each country, where Zjnn = Y jn −
∑I
i=1,i6=n Z
j
in. Domestic sales are defined as the difference
between gross production in country n and its total exports. Secondly, by calculating the surplus (net
export) for each country n and each sector j, Sjn =
∑I
i=1 Z
j
in −
∑I
i=1 Z
j
ni.
26To conduct the simulation I adpot and adjust the codes provided by Caliendo and Parro (2015).
27In some sectors the tariffs are still high on average, which is particular the case for Japan. Here following
sectors stand out: Crops Animals (24%), Food, Beverages Tabaco (18%), Forestry Logging (13%),
Textiles, Apparel, Leather (11%). For simplicity reason it is assumed in this paper that tariffs of these
sectors are also set to zero. However, the outcome of the negotiations might lead to a different result
of the tariff reduction.
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scenario targets a potential shallow agreement where all tariffs are cut and non-tariff barriers are
scaled down moderately. The third scenario covers the implementation of a deep FTA where
all tariffs are reduced to zero and the NTMs are profoundly scaled-down. It is assumed that
the deep FTA is the most likely scenario, as the Japan administration is eager to reduce the US
non-tariff measures in order to have better market access to the United States. Lastly, I compare
the trade effects of TPP (including the US) and a deep bilateral trade agreement between Japan
and the United States. Hereby, TPP is considered to be a deep multilateral trade agreement.
5.1. Trade policy scenarios
Table 5.1 presents the results for the three potential FTAs and their impact on bilateral imports
between the United States and Japan.28 The bilateral imports take account of intermediate
and finals goods from all sectors, including the service sectors. In all scenarios, the US imports
more goods and services from Japan as vice versa. Hence, the US bilateral trade deficit increases
under every form of trade policy.29
Table 5.1.: Bilateral Imports between USA and Japan (in bn US$)
USA Japan
Tariff Reduction Bilateral imports 126.6 69.2
(Scenario 1) Absolute change +4.5 +5.6
Relative change 3.7% 8.9%
Shallow FTA Bilateral imports 152.7 83.8
(Scenario 2) Absolute change +30.7 +20.2
Relative change 25.2% 31.8%
Deep FTA Bilateral imports 176.6 99.5
(Scenario 3) Absolute change +54.5 +35.8
Relative change 44.7% 56.4%
In the first trade policy scenario, the import growth is greater in Japan than in the United
States (in absolute and relative changes). This is not surprising as Japan charges on average 4%
higher tariffs on US products. A reduction of all tariffs has therefore a stronger effect on the
Japanese import growth. In the second and third scenario, with tariff cuts and an additional
28I conduct the results from the status quo, without a change in trade policies.
29The largest trade deficit occurs in the case of the deep FTA, where the United States imports goods
and services worth 176.6 billion US$ from Japan and exports 99.5 billion US$.
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reduction of the NTMs the import rates are even higher in both countries than in the first
scenario (in absolute and relative changes). Also, in both scenarios the import of Japanese
products to the US grows stronger than the US goods to Japan (in absolute changes). This can
be explained by the fact, that the United States have more NTMs on Japanese products than
vice versa, as shown in section 2. Thus, a NTM reduction leads to more imports on the US side.
However, Japan also benefits from the NTMs reduction and has even higher growth rates than
the US in relative changes: The United States experiences an import growth of 25.2% in the
shallow and a growth of 44.7% in the deep case, whereas the Japanese import growth is larger
with 31.8% in the first scenario and 56.4% in the latter scenario.
Table 5.2.: Impact of trade policies on welfare
Country Total Welfare ToT VoT
Effects
Tariff Reduction Japan -0.001% -0.004% 0.003%
(Scenario 1) USA 0.003% 0.0008% 0.002%
Shallow Integration Japan 0.045% 0.026% 0.019%
(Scenario 2) USA -0.001% -0.013% 0.012%
Deep Integration Japan 0.085% 0.054% 0.031%
(Scenario 3) USA -0.007% -0.016% 0.009%
Table 5.2 displays the impact on the welfare change by the three trade policies scenarios. In the
first scenario, Japan is experiencing a negative effect on welfare (−0.001%). The negative effect
is mainly driven by terms of trade (ToT) (−0.004%), which is larger than the volume of trade
(VoT) (0.003%). As seen in section 3.7, the terms of trade are an indication for the purchasing
power of a country and depend on the sectoral trade deficit, the sectoral change in import, and
export prices. On the one hand, Japan has (on average) a sectoral trade deficit hence it imports
more than it exports in the most sectors. One the other hand, the average sectoral export and
import prices are decreasing with a relatively stronger reaction in export prices.30 The effect
of the sectoral weights are not as strong as the export and import price changes, which is the
most dominantly effect. Henceforth the terms of trade turn out to be negative.31 Regarding
30The export price depends on wage changes and the change of the prices for the intermediate goods,
which are in turn influenced by the tariff reduction, see equation 3.6 and 3.7. The reduction of tariffs
leads to a wage increase in by 0.01% and at the same time to a price index change of −0.02%, hence
the change of export prices is negative.
31Japans imports are larger than its exports (174 billion US$ in imports and 173 billion US$ in exports),
yet the average import price change is smaller than the export price change. Therefore, in total the
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the shallow and deep scenario, the welfare impact for Japan is positive in both scenarios and
becomes stronger as the FTA deepens. The story for the United States is different: In the first
scenario the United States experiences welfare gains by a positive volume of trade and terms of
trade. However, for a shallow and deep FTA the overall effects are negative. In both scenarios
the negative impact on welfare is driven by the terms of trade: −0.013% in the case of a shallow
FTA and −0.016% in the deep scenario, which are each larger than the positive effects of the
volume of trade.
In the next step, I show the source of the welfare effects in more detail. Table 5.3 displays the
welfare changes that derives either directly through the trade creation of the FTA or indirectly
through the rest of the world (ROW). The results from Table 5.2 show that in the first scenario
Table 5.3.: Bilateral welfare effects of the FTA
ToT VoT
Country FTA ROW FTA ROW
Tariff Reduction Japan -0.001% -0.003% 0.005% -0.002%
(Scenario 1) USA 0.0002% 0.0006% 0.002% -4.3e-05%
Shallow Integration Japan 0.004% 0.022% 0.011% 0.008%
(Scenario 2) USA -0.001% -0.012% 0.004% 0.008%
Deep Integration Japan 0.008% 0.046% 0.017% 0.014%
(Scenario 3) USA -0.002% -0.014% 0.004% 0.005%
the terms of trade are in total negative for Japan. The decline in terms of trade is driven by the
FTA (−0.001%) and even more by the ROW (−0.003%). This is because Japan’s export prices
fall relatively stronger than the import prices of the ROW. In addition, Japan is experiencing a
negative impact through the ROW (−0.002%) in volume of trade, though this effect is outweighed
by a positive volume of trade impact via the trade of the FTA (0.005%). These results can be
explained by the concept of trade diversion where trading with the members within the FTA,
driven by a new trade policy, becomes relatively cheaper than trading with the ROW. Hence,
the volume of trade rises within the FTA and falls with the ROW.
In the case of a potential shallow FTA the largest driver of welfare comes from the ROW in
terms of trade (0.022%). Regarding the volume of trade, the FTA and the ROW contribute
similarly to the welfare growth, with 0.011% and 0.008% respectively. A potential deep FTA
export weighted by the change in export prices (-783 million US$) is smaller than the import weighted
by the changes in import prices. That causes the terms of trade to be negative.
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contributes the most to Japans welfare growth, especially through the ROW in terms of trade
(0.046%), followed by the FTA (0.017%) and the ROW (0.014%) through the volume of trade.
As regards the United States, the tariff reduction has only a small effect on welfare in terms of
trade. In scenario 1 the welfare is almost entirely driven by the FTA via the volume of trade,
which comes from the increase of Japanese goods to the United States and the reduction of
Japanese export prices. Interestingly, the shallow and deep agreement have a similar impact on
the welfare change. In both scenarios the FTA and ROW have a negative impact on the welfare
effect through the terms of trade. Considering the volume of trade, the growth rates through the
FTA is the same in both cases and is even higher in the shallow scenario with 0.008% compared
to the 0.005% in the deep scenario.
Keeping these results in mind, the United States should prefer a shallow agreement whilst
Japan should favor a deep FTA. As mentioned in the introduction, a deep FTA is most likely
to be established from a political standpoint. Therefore, I will focus in the following on the
trade effects of a deep FTA.32 Table 5.4 shows the sectoral contribution to the welfare change
for the deep scenario in terms of trade and volume of trade. Remarkably, there are only a
handful of sectors which drive welfare: First, consider the sectoral contribution in welfare by
the volume of trade of the United States, displayed in column 4. Here, the Crops and Animals
sector, the sector for Food, Beverages & Tobacco, and the sector for Fabricated Metal stand out.
Together they contribute with 109.5% for the welfare gains in the volume of trade. Note, that
the high contribution of the Crops and Animals sector (53.7%) is steered by the reduction of
NTMs. Comparing it to the case where only the tariffs are reduced, the sector adds only 8%
to the welfare gains and rises to 43.4% in the shallow scenario. There are also sectors which
contribute negatively to the welfare change in volume of trade, particularly the Electronics &
Optical Products, Motor Vehicles, Electrical Equipment as well as the Machinery & Equipment
sector. Together they are responsible for 25.15% of the welfare losses.
In the case of a deep FTA, no sector contributes negatively for Japan in terms of volume of
trade. Also, the sectors are less concentrated in their contribution to the welfare effect. The
largest impact comes through the Electronics & Optical Products sector (19.6%), Food, Beverages
& Tobacco (15.6%) and the sector of Crops & Animals (15.1%). Also the Motor Vehicles sector
(11.9%) adds positively to the welfare effect through volume of trade.
32The sectoral results for the tariff and shallow scenario are displayed in the appendix A.5 and A.6.
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Table 5.4.: Sectoral contribution to welfare effects in the case of a potential deep FTA
Japan USA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sector ToT VoT ToT VoT
Crops & Animals 0.50% 15.1% 2.17% 53.7%
Forestry & Logging 0.04% 0.31% -0.02% 0.24%
Fishing & Aquaculture 0.04% 0.06% -0.001% 0.45%
Mining & Quarrying 3.26% 1.38% 0.77% -1.12%
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 1.59% 15.6% 2.99% 33.3%
Textiles, Apparel,Leather 1.47% 3.37% -0.82% 3.91%
Wood & Cork 0.20% 0.60% 0.07% 0.05%
Paper 0.72% 0.03% 1.14% -0.06%
Recorded Media Reproduction 0.07% 0.01% 0.14% 0.002%
Coke, Refined Petroleum 2.08% 1.10% 2.32% 0.19%
Chemicals 1.83% 5.46% 4.13% 4.42%
Pharmaceuticals 1.20% 0.74% 1.24% 1.42%
Rubber & Plastics 2.81% 2.34% 1.61% 0.30%
Other non-Metallic Mineral 1.59% 0.91% 0.54% 0.39%
Basic Metals 6.88% 5.38% 1.61% -0.42%
Fabricated Metal 5.50% 3.21% 3.66% 22.5%
Electronics & Optical Products 10.5% 19.6% 3.85% -14.5%
Electrical Equipment 6.04% 5.44% 2.80% -3.07%
Machinery & Equipment 9.73% 1.39% 10.5% -1.33%
Motor Vehicles 15.6% 11.9% 29.2% -6.27%
Other Transport Equipment -3.02% 0.03% 11.9% 0.01%
Furniture & Other Manufacturing 1.28% 1.88% 1.42% 6.00%
Aggregated Services 30.09% 4.16% 18.78% -0.112%
The sectoral influence through the terms of trade is displayed in column 1 and 3 of Table 5.4.
In terms of trade Japan has the highest contribution in the Motor Vehicles sector (15.6%), the
sector for Electronics & Optical Products (10.5%) and Machinery (9.73%). Similar to Japan
the main growth driver for the United States is the Motor Vehicles sector (29.2%), followed
by Other Transport Equipment (11.9%) and Machinery (10.5%). Also service sectors have a
positive impact on welfare gains through the terms of trade. This is due to the fact that the
service sectors are also affected by the changes in export and import prices. Especially services
can be impacted directly by the FTA foremost via the reduction of NTMs. Tariff can hardly be
charged on services, only indirectly through the interrelations with non-services sectors, which
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are directly targeted by the trade policy.33 In both countries the aggregated service sectors have
a large impact on welfare growth, with 18.78% and 30.09% respectively.34
5.2. TPP vs a bilateral FTA
In this section, I present the results of the counterfactual simulation of the TPP and compare
it with the trade and welfare effects of a deep FTA. Table 5.5 displays the results of TPP’s
trade effects in relative changes. The findings clearly indicate a strong increase in exports for
all TPP countries. Japan exports goods to the United States with the value of 164 billion US$
in total. Compared to the status quo this is an increase of 34.8%, which is however smaller
as through the deep FTA (44.7%). The United States export, 97 billion US$ to Japan - an
export increase of 52.8%. This is slightly less when contrasted with the impact of the deep FTA
(56.4%).35 Canada, Mexico and the United States already have strong trade relationships with a
Table 5.5.: Trade effects from TPP
Importer
Exporter Japan USA Australia Canada Chile Mexico
Japan 52.8% 62.3% 70.1% 57.4% 55%
USA 34.8% 40.6% 35.3% 44.7% 49.2%
Australia 41.7% 39.8% 52.6% 53.3% 40%
Canada 27.5% 39.3% 61.6% 48.4% 44.1%
Chile 41.1% 40% 50% 46.4% 47.4%
Mexico 50.6% 51.1% 154% 85% 65.2%
large amount of exports. This is the case because they are geographically close to each other
and well connected through NAFTA. Additionally, those three countries could intensify their
trade through TPP. Explicitly, the high export growth rate between Canada and Mexico (85%)
stands out. The reason for this is that the export from Canada to Mexico has been the lowest
between the NAFTA members and therefore TPP’s trade cost reduction leads to a relatively
strong export enhancing effect. In addition, Australia’s exports to Canada (61.6%) and to Japan
(62.3%)36 are strongly growing, and the exports to Mexico (154%) increase even more. The low
33The contribution to welfare by volume of trade is small for the service sectors. This is because the
volume of trade is stirred mainly by import of goods, which by nature services are not.
34The reason for the high shares is that the services are aggregated.
35In appendix A.7 I give an overview of absolute changes through TPP.
36TPP boosts Australia’s exports to Japan from 47 billion US$ to 77 billion US$.
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exports between Australia and Mexico before TPP are the reasons for this strong export growth.
Within all TPP countries the exports from Australia to Mexico are the smallest (0.4 billon US$)
and grow through the multilateral trade agreement by 0.7 billion US$, which leads to the high
export growth in relative changes.
The changes of the export shares by the FTA and TPP are displayed in table 5.6. The 50
WIOD industries are aggregated into four main categories: Agriculture-, mining-, manufacturing-
and service sector. Column 1 and 4 reflect the status quo, which are the export shares without
any counterfactual trade policy adjustments.
Table 5.6.: Export shares by sectors and trade agreements
Japan USA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Status Quo FTA TPP Status Quo FTA TPP
Agriculture 0.11% 0.12% 0.12% 2.82% 2.92% 2.93%
Mining 0.34% 0.34% 0.40% 2.33% 2.41% 4.00%
Manufacturing 81.54% 83.00% 82.94% 54.48% 54.69% 56.12%
Service 18.01% 16.54% 16.99% 40.37% 39.88% 36.95%
Normalized Herfindahl 0.076 0.081 0.078 0.025 0.025 0.024
The export shares from Japan and the United States take the exports to all countries into account. They do not just focus
on the bilateral exports between Japan and the United States.
Column 1 shows that the Japanese manufacturing sector has the largest export share followed
by the service sector - the other two sectors play a minor role.37 The two trade agreements have
only marginal effects on the change of the export shares. In both counterfactual scenarios the
largest changes occur between the manufacturing and the service sector. Compared to TPP
the bilateral FTA strengthens the export of the manufacturing sectors slightly more and has
a moderately lower service export share. The export shares of the United States are more
diversified. Focusing first on the baseline, the US agriculture, mining and service sector have
higher shares than those of Japan, whereas the manufacturing sector is considerably smaller.
Through the FTA and even more through TPP the mining and the manufacturing sectors get
larger export shares, while the service sector loses. In addition, the normalized Herfindahl index
(HHI) also reveals that Japan’s export sectors are three times more specialized than those of the
37The three largest export industries reflect a similar structure: The Motor Vehicle industry (18.9%) as
the largest and the Electronics & Optical Products (14%) as the second largest export industry are
both part of the manufacturing sector. While the Wholesale Trade (9.42%) industry counts for the
service sector.
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United States, when comparing the HHI between Japan (0.076) and US (0.025) in the baseline
case. The implementation of the FTA and TPP has small specification effects for Japan, as the
HHI indicates. For the US the HHI shows a small diversion of the export shares in the case of
TPP and no changes through an FTA.
Table 5.7.: Welfare effects of TPP
Country Total ToT VoT
Japan 0.05% -0.01% 0.06%
USA 0.05% -0.04% 0.09%
Australia 0.122% 0.12% 0.002%
Canada 0.20% 0.17% 0.03%
Chile 0.35% 0.34% 0.01%
Mexico 0.56% 0.46% 0.10%
Table 5.7 presents the key findings for the welfare gains of the TPP countries. With 0.05%
Japan and the US have the lowest welfare gains amongst the TPP members. In comparison
to the potential bilateral FTA Japan experiences lower welfare gains, while the United States
improves its welfare gains through TPP. In both countries the welfare gains are impacted by the
negative effects of the terms of trade, as column 2 reflects. Interestingly, the cause of the negative
impact in terms of trade differs for Japan and the United States. For Japan, the negative welfare
effect in terms of trade can be explained by the larger reduction of average export prices (-0.25%)
relative to the average import prices (-0.23%). On the other side, the negative terms of trade of
the US are driven by large sectoral trade deficits. It turns out that the United States experiences
large amounts of sectoral trade deficits especially with TPP countries. Hence, the TPP members
contribute with -0.03% negatively to the of terms of trade (-0.04% in total).38 Japan and the
United States mainly benefit from TPP through the welfare gains in volume of trade, with
0.06% and 0.09% respectively. Worth mentioning is that for both countries the welfare effects
in volumes of trade come predominantly from TPP countries. But at the same time both are
negatively impacted by the trade with the ROW in volume of trade.39 The argument is again
that through the implementation of TPP trade diversion occurs. TPP’s trade cost reduction
makes trade within the TPP group relatively cheaper than with Non-TPP countries. This in
38I show the origin of the bilateral welfare effects by TPP in the appendix A.8.
39Through the trade with TPP members Japan welfare grows by 0.063% in volume of trade. While the
trade with the ROW contributes negatively to the welfare change in volume of trade (-0.008%). The
US benefits from the TPP countries in volume of trade by 0.11% and experiences welfare loses via the
ROW by -0.024%.
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turn leads to import growth amongst TPP member states, whilst imports from other countries
decline. Hence, TPP impacts the welfare change in volume of trade positively for TPP members
and negatively for ROW. As I have mentioned above all other TPP countries have higher welfare
Table 5.8.: Countries and Welfare effects of a deep FTA and TPP
Deep FTA TPP
Australia 0.004% 0.122%
Brazil 0.001% 0.009%
Canada 0.024% 0.201%
Chile 0.029% 0.353%
China -0.005% -0.030%
EU∗ -0.002% -0.016%
France -0.001% -0.002%
Germany -0.016% -0.087%
Indonesia -0.016% -0.075%
India -0.0007% -0.002%
Italy -0.004% -0.025%
Japan 0.085% 0.042%
South Korea -0.028% -0.139%
Mexico 0.094% 0.561%
Norway -0.003% -0.018%
Russia 0.0002% -0.004%
Spain -0.001% -0.015%
Turkey -0.002% -0.010%
Taiwan -0.025% -0.131%
UK -0.0004% -0.0008%
USA -0.006% 0.049%
ROW 0.004% 0.030%
∗ Note, that the welfare effects of the EU are averages
and do not include the UK.
gains than Japan and the United States: Australia has a 0.122%, Canada a 0.20%, Chile a 0.35%
and Mexico a 0.56% increase in welfare. For all of those countries welfare grows mainly through
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contribution of the terms of trade.40 Especially Chile and Mexico have large amounts of sectoral
trade surplus which add positively to their welfare gains in terms of trade.41
For a sample of countries, table 5.8 compares the total welfare effects of a deep FTA to the
welfare changes driven by TPP. Not surprisingly the TPP members (other than Japan and the
US) are all better off when TPP is in place, due to the direct reduction of trade costs. For
countries who are already negatively impacted by the deep FTA as for example China, Indonesia
or South Korea the trade liberalization of TPP will increase the negative effects on welfare. For
most countries the impact on welfare loses is caused by terms of trade. Only marginal effects are
caused by volume of trade, as small amounts of imports are directly created for other countries.
However, other countries benefit from the FTA and even more from TPP as for example Brazil,
which increase also mainly due to higher terms of trade. Russia benefits slightly from the deep
FTA (0.0002%), which is caused by a higher volume of trade (0.0004%) compared to the negative
terms of trade (-0.0002%). However, the discussed welfare changes are small and the results
can therefore change easily through a change in trade policy. This is also the case if TPP is
implemented: The total welfare is negative with -0.004%, caused by a larger negative impact of
the terms of trade (-0.005%) compared to a small welfare change in volume of trade (0.001%).
6. Conclusion
Although Japan and the United States are responsible of roughly 30% of the global GDP, they
are not connected via a trade agreement. As I show in this paper, the export shares from the
United States to Japan have decreased over the last decade, as vice versa. A potential trade
agreement has not only the potential to increase the bilateral export shares but also to raise
the welfare gains of both countries. In this context, two potential trade agreements between
Japan and the United States are currently discussed: A bilateral free trade agreement and the
multilateral TPP. This paper provides insides for political discussion. One argument of the US
administration of rejoining the negations of TPP is, that through TPP the American agriculture
40The weak contribution to welfare by volume of trade is again caused by trade diversion. The welfare
growth by TPP countries is diluted by the welfare loses of the ROW. This is in particular true for
Australia and Canada.
41Note that Mexico is a supplier of intermediate goods mainly to TPP members. Hence, the largest
amount of Mexico’s sectoral trade surpluses comes from within the TPP group. While Chile’s trade
surplus is generate primarily by ROW countries.
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sector will benefit by more exporting. This paper confirms that the agriculture export share of
the United States will increase (compared to the baseline (2.82%)) through the FTA (2.92%)
and slightly more through TPP (2.93%). A major finding is that the United States is indeed
better of when joining TPP. The total welfare gains are with 0.05% the highest in the case of
TPP compared with any of the three other FTA scenarios. However, Japan is expected to prefer
a deep bilateral FTA as it leads to the largest welfare gains of 0.085%. From the perspective of
the EU it would be preferred if a bilateral FTA is established, as the welfare losses would be
smaller (-0.002%) than in the case of TPP (-0.016%).
To conduct the counterfactual analysis I rely in this paper on the theoretical foundation of
Caliendo and Parro (2015), which is part of the new quantitative trade theory. I then apply
the Caliendo and Parro (2015) model empirically using the approach of Aichele et al. (2014).
Hereby, the most recent WIOD (released 2016) is used for the year 2014, includes 50 sectors
and 43 countries plus the rest of the world. The degree of trade barriers reduction for the trade
agreement is not yet known, as a workaround, I apply the top-down method by Aichele et al.
(2014) to simulate the trade barriers reduction. The top-down method uses past trade agreements
as a benchmark to quantify the possible welfare impact of TPP and the FTA. However, the
results will be much more precise once the outcomes of the negotiation of either a FTA or TPP
are made public. Thus, the reduction of tariffs and NTMs do not have to be estimated anymore.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Composite Intermediate Goods in
Non-Tradeable Sectors
In the case of the non-tradable sector, it is always cheaper to produce the intermediate good
domestically. The production function of the composite good is the same as in the case of the
tradable sector:
qjn =
[∫
qjn(xj)(1−1)/η
jΦj(xj)dxj
]ηj/(ηj−1)
(A.1)
However, the density function is different:
Φj(xj) = (λjn) exp
{
−λjnxjn
}
(A.2)
Solving the minimization problem leads to the following result: pjn(xj) = pjn(xjn). This result is
similar to the definition of the non-tradable sector. The lowest intermediate good price of sector
j is the price of the intermediate good of country n.
A.2. General Equilibrium
In the context of sectoral input-output linkages, the equilibrium wages and prices are such that
they maximize the consumer’s utility and the profit of the firms for each sector in each country.
In addition, good- and labor market clearing conditions must hold. Caliendo and Parro (2012,
p.15) specify the general equilibrium in the following way:
Definition 1: Given Ln, Sn, λji and d
j
ni, an equilibrium under trade policy of τ is a wage
vector w ∈ RN++ and P jn that solves equilibrium conditions for all J and N :
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Cost of the input bundle of country n in sector j:
cjn = wβ
j
n
n
(
J∏
k=1
(P kn )γ
k,j
n
)1−βjn
(A.3)
Price of the composite intermediate good in country n of sector j:
P jn = AjBj
[∑
i
[kjnic
j
i ](−1/θ
j)λji
]−θj
(A.4)
Bilateral trade share of country i with respect to country n in sector j:
pijni = (AjBj)−1/θ
j
(
cjik
j
ni
P jn
)−1/θj
λji (A.5)
Spending on trade in sector j of country n:
Xjn =
J∑
k=1
γj,kn (1− βjn)
(∑
i=1
pikin
(1 + τkin)
Xki
)
+ αjnIn (A.6)
Trade balance:
J∑
j=1
F jnX
j
n + Sn =
J∑
j=1
N∑
i=1
pijin
(1 + τ jin)
Xji (A.7)
A.3. Equilibrium in Relative Changes
To solve the equilibrium model, the steps below have to be followed, which are based on Caliendo
and Parro (2015).
Step 1: Calculate pijin, γj,kn , βjn, αjn, for all j and n
Bilateral trade share: pijin = (Z
j
in)/(Y jn − Sji )
Share that sector k spends on goods of sector j: γj,kn = hj,kn /
∑
j h
j,k
n
Share of the value added: βjn = V Ajn/Y jn
Share of the final demand good in sector j: αjn =
Y jn−Sjn−
∑J
k
γj,kn (1−βjn)γkn
In
Step 2: Estimate productivity θj and the parameters δshallow and δdeep.
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Step 3: Construct kˆjn:
For the model of Caliendo and Parro (2012) use kˆjin =
1+τ j
′
in
1+τ jin
, with tariff structures τ and τˆ ′.
For the model of Aichele et al. (2014) use τ and τˆ ′ and δshallow and δdeep to get kˆjin =
τˆ jine
δj
shallow
(PTA′(shallow,in)−PTA(shallow,in))+δ
j
deep
(PTA′(deep,in)−PTA(deep,in)).
Step 4: Guess a vector of wage changes wˆ = (wˆ1, ˙..., wˆn).
Step 5: Use wˆ, kˆjn, pi
j
in, γj,kn , βjn, δj to solve for equilibrium input costs cˆjn(wˆ) and prices Pˆ jn(wˆ)
for each sector and each country, which are consistent with the vector of wages wˆ.
Step 6: Use cˆjn(wˆ) and prices Pˆ jn(wˆ), together with kˆ
j
in and θj to calculate the bilateral trade
shares pij
′
ni(wˆ) under the trade policy of τ ′, this is done by using pˆi
j
ni.
Step 7: Given pij
′
ni(wˆ) from step 6, and the tariff vector τ ′ the value of weighted tariffs
F j
′
n =
∑N
i=1
pij
′
ni(wˆ)
(1+τ j′ni)
can be calculated. Further, Xj′n (wˆ) consists with the vector of wages (wˆ) in
the following way:
Xjn =
J∑
k=1
γj,kn (1− βjn)
(∑
i=1
pikin(wˆ)
(1 + τkin)
Xki
)
+ αjn
[
wnLn +
J∑
n=1
Xjn
[
1− F jn
]
− Sn
]
(A.8)
From equation A.8, the counterfactual equation can be derived:
Xj
′
n =
J∑
k=1
γj,kn (1− βjn)
(∑
i=1
pik
′
in(wˆ)
(1 + τk′in)
Xk
′
i
)
+ αjn
[
wˆnwnLn +
J∑
n=1
Xj
′
n
[
1− F j′n
]
− Sn
]
(A.9)
The equation can also be expressed in a matrix form, because it consists as a system of J ×N in
J ×N .
Ω(wˆ)X = ∆(wˆ) (A.10)
33
Here, ∆(wˆ) is a vector which involves the shares for each sector and country of the sum of
nominal income minus the surplus for each country. Vector X includes the expenditure levels for
each sector and country. Those vectors are defined in the following way:
∆(wˆ) =

α11
(
wˆnwnLn − S′n
)
...
αJ1
(
wˆnwnLn − S′n
)
...
α1N
(
wˆnwnLn − S′n
)
...
αJN
(
wˆnwnLn − S′n
)

JN×1
; X =

X1
′
1
...
XJ
′
1
...
X1
′
n
...
XJ
′
N

JN×1
(A.11)
Ω(wˆ) is a matrix which consists out of three parts, Ω(wˆ) = I − F (wˆ)− Hˆ(wˆ). Hereby, I is the
identity matrix and F (wˆ) is defined as:
F (wˆ) =

A1
⊗
F˜ ′1(wˆ) . . . 0J×J . . . 0J×J . . . 0J×J
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
0J×J . . . A2
⊗
F˜ ′2(wˆ) . . . 0J×J . . . 0J×J
...
...
... . . .
...
...
...
0J×J . . . 0J×J . . . AN−1
⊗
F˜ ′N−1(wˆ) . . . 0J×J
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
0J×J . . . 0J×J . . . 0J×J . . . AN
⊗
F˜ ′N (wˆ)

JN×JN
(A.12)
Note that F (wˆ) involves the vectors:
An =

α1n
...
αJn

JN×1
, F˜ ′n(wˆ) =
(
(1− F 1′n (wˆ)) . . . (1− F 1
′
n (wˆ))
)
1×J (A.13)
with F j′n (wˆ) =
∑N
i=1
pij
′
ni(wˆ)
(1+τ j′ni)
.
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H˜(wˆ) is defined in the following way, which includes p˜ik′in(wˆ) =
pik
′
in(wˆ)
1+τk′in
:
H(wˆ) =

γ
1,1
1 (1 − β
1
1)p˜i
1′
1,1(wˆ) . . . γ
1,J
1 (1 − β
J
1 )p˜i
J′
1,1(wˆ) . . . γ
1,1
1 (1 − β
1
1)p˜i
1′
N,1(wˆ) . . . γ
1,J
1 (1 − β
J
1 )p˜i
J′
N,1(wˆ)
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
γ
J,1
1 (1 − β
1
1)p˜i
1′
1,1(wˆ) . . . γ
J,J
1 (1 − β
J
1 )p˜i
J′
1,1(wˆ) . . . γ
J,1
1 (1 − β
1
1)p˜i
1′
N,1(wˆ) . . . γ
J,J
1 (1 − β
J
1 )p˜i
J′
N,1(wˆ)
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
γ
1,1
N
(1 − β1
N
)p˜i1
′
1,N (wˆ) . . . γ
1,J
N
(1 − βJ
N
)p˜iJ
′
1,N (wˆ) . . . γ
1,1
N
(1 − β1
N
)p˜i1
′
N,N
(wˆ) . . . γ1,J
N
(1 − βJ
N
)p˜iJ
′
N,N
(wˆ)
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
γ
J,1
N
(1 − β1
N
)p˜i1
′
1,N (wˆ) . . . γ
J,J
N
(1 − βJ
N
)p˜iJ
′
1,N (wˆ) . . . γ
J,1
N
(1 − β1
N
)p˜i1
′
N,N
(wˆ) . . . γJ,J
N
(1 − βJ
N
)p˜iJ
′
N,N
(wˆ)

JN×JN
(A.14)
Ωn(wˆ) is important, because it describes how a change of tariffs in a particular sector is
affecting all other sectors. Let there be no tariffs and no other composite goods from other
sectors be used in the production of sector j, γj,jn = 1, then there is no linkage between sectors,
and the matrix Ωn(wˆ) is a diagonal. Solving the system of equation for X(wˆ) (total expenditure
of country n) leads to the following solution if Ωn(wˆ) is invertible:
X(wˆ) = Ω−1(wˆ)∆(wˆ) (A.15)
Let Xj′n (wˆ) be the total expenditure of the material in sector j of country n. Combining the
trade balance condition with the good market clearing condition, the trade balance condition
can be re-conducted, now including the wage vector of unknowns, wˆ.
Step 8: Insert pij
′
in(wˆ), X(wˆ), τ ′ and S′n to obtain:
J∑
j=1
F jn
′Xjn
′ + Sn =
J∑
j=1
N∑
i=1
pij
′
in(wˆ)
(1 + τ j′in)
Xji
′ (A.16)
Which leads to:
J∑
j=1
N∑
i=1
pij
′
ni(wˆ)
(1 + τ j′ni)
Xj
′
n (wˆ) + Sn =
J∑
j=1
N∑
i=1
pij
′
in(wˆ)
(1 + τ j′in)
Xj
′
i (wˆ) (A.17)
The last step is to identify the correct vector of wage changes wˆ = (wˆ1, . . . , wˆn). The correct
vector is found if the the equilibrium equation A.17 is in balance. If the equation does not hold,
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the vector of wage changes has to be guessed again, and the algorithm is repeated. The process
continues until the correct vector in wage changes wˆ is found.
A.4. Sector Overview & Delta
Figure A.1.: Sector Overview & Delta (Data: Aichele et al. (2014))
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A.5. Sectoral contribution to welfare - Tariff
Reduction
Figure A.2.: Sectoral contribution to welfare - Tariff Reduction
A.6. Sectoral contribution to welfare - Shallow FTA
Figure A.3.: Sectoral contribution to welfare - Shallow FTA
37
A.7. TPP changes on Exports
Figure A.4.: TPP changes on exports (in million US$)
A.8. Bilateral welfare effects of TPP
Table A.1.: Bilateral welfare effects of TPP
ToT VoT
Country TPP ROW TPP ROW
Japan -0.011% -0.001% 0.063% -0.008%
USA -0.029% -0.009% 0.11% -0.024%
Australia 0.029% 0.09% 0.020% -0.018%
Canada 0.071% 0.1% 0.066% -0.036%
Chile 0.032% 0.307% 0.008% 0.004%
Mexico 0.310% 0.15% 0.053% 0.046%
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